Comparison is fundamental to the practice and subject-matter of philosophy, but has received scant attention by philosophers. This is even so in "comparative philosophy," which literally distinguishes itself from other philosophy by being "comparative." In this article, the need for a philosophy of comparison is suggested. What we compare with what, and in what respect it is done, poses a series of intriguing and intricate questions. In Part One, I offer a problematization of the tertium comparationis (the third of comparison) by examining conceptualizations of similarity, family resemblance, and analogy, which it is sometimes argued can do without a tertium comparationis. In Part Two, I argue that a third of comparison is already required to determine what is to be compared, and insofar as that determination precedes the comparison that tertium may be called "pre-comparative." This leads me to argue against incomparability and to show how anything can indeed be compared to anything. In Part Three, I relate my arguments to what is today commonly labelled "comparative philosophy." Finally, I raise some questions of ontology and politics in order to demonstrate the relevance of a philosophy of comparison.
Introduction
It is very ordinary for us to engage in comparisons of all sorts. We hardly ever reflect on that fact and, indeed, there is perhaps little to recommend such reflection in most cases, as most of our comparisons do not misfire, so to say, but are readily and aptly understood. We hence do not routinely (and do not expect that others might) call into question our comparisons, their starting-points, and the respect in which that which is compared is and is not thought to coincide. Nonetheless, such calling into question is inwith claims of new scholarly insight or where they are used to advance religious, political or other aims. It might even be of some urgency in cases where it is impossible, with all good will, to disentangle scholarly claim from religious or political aim.
Christian Wolff, the German Enlightenment philosopher, experienced firsthand that comparisons matter and why it might be important to be very clear on what is compared with what and in what respect it is done. His vice-presidential farewell address at the University of Halle, "On the Practical Philosophy of the Chinese," on 12 July 1721 enraged not only the powerful Pietists, but also the Prussian King Frederick William I, who thereupon had Wolff deprived of his office and ordered to leave Prussian territory within 48 hours-or else he would be hanged, "bey Strafe des Stranges" (Albrecht 1985: li) . What had Wolff said in his address to receive such a response? For one thing, he had likened the esteem in which Confucius was held by the Chinese to that of Moses, Mohammed, and Jesus, which, in the eyes of the Pietists, meant to put Confucius on a par with Jesus and hence constituted blasphemy. What is interesting here is that Wolff tried to show that the Pietists' interpretation of his comparison was grossly mistaken due to a wrongly conceived tertium comparationis (the third of comparison). The respect in which he had compared Confucius, Moses, Mohammed, and Jesus was not their character, nor the justification of their esteem, but simply the fact that they were held in such esteem by their followers (Wolff 1985: 17, 116-123) . The whole affair influenced Wolff's philosophy greatly. Henceforth, he was of the firm opinion that any use of metaphor in philosophy should be accepted only if the tertium comparationis was clearly indicated and explained (Albus 2001: 30-31) .
1 The story about Christian Wolff is telling insofar as he expressis verbis refers to the tertium comparationis and does so only some 25 years after the earliest occurrence of the notion in a text of 1693-and as it showcases the possible political use of comparisons.
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The tertium comparationis is one of four aspects in standard conceptualizations of comparison such as the following: (1) a comparison is always done by someone, (2) at least two relata (comparata) are compared, (3) the comparata are compared in some respect (tertium comparationis), and (4) the result of a comparison is a relation between the comparata on the basis of the chosen respect. Put simply, if one sets out to compare, say, the notion of human nature in the Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius) and in the Xunzi 荀子, one assumes or asserts a notion of human nature about which no more must be claimed than that it is equally relatable to both. In this example, the Mengzi and the Xunzi are the 1 The passage by Wolff mentioning the tertium comparationis reads in the original: "Bei einer jeden verblümten Redensart (metaphora) haben wir zwei Begriffe, deren einer ohne dem andern seyn kan, aus deren Vergleichung aber durch die (Abstraktion) Absonderung ein gewisser dritter Begriff entstehet, welcher etwas vorstellet, das in beyden zugleich befindlich ist, und deswegen die Sache, worinn die Vergleichung geschiehet (tertium comparationis), genennet wird, auser welchem die Aehnlichkeit, darauf die verblümte Redensart (metaphora) sich gründet, sich nicht erstrecket." [With each allusive figure of speech (metaphora) we have two concepts, of which each can be without the other, and of the comparison of which by way of dissociation (abstraction) a certain third concept emerges, which presents something present in both simultaneously. Therefore the matter in which the comparison occurs is called tertium comparationis. Beyond it, the similarity, on which the allusive figure of speech (metaphora) is based, does not reach.] (Wolff 1981: 81-82) . 2 Although the subject matter expressed by the tertium comparationis is dealt with in the context of metaphors in Plato , Aristotle (Topics 140a8-13; Poetics 1457b; Rhetoric 1406b), Cicero (De Oratore, III, XXXIX, 157), and Quintillian (Institutio Oratoria, VIII, VI, 8), the expression itself is attested only as late as in the Baroque period. The Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie mentions Erhard Weigel and his 1693 book Philosophia Mathematica (Thiel 2004: 239-240) .
